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CHOICE OF LAW METHODOLOGY IN THE 
RESTATEMENT， SECOND， CONFLICT OF LAWSt 
Hiroshi MATSUOKA* 
Choice of law methodologies are beingmost vigorously discussed in the 
United States. The impact of American methodologies on the choice of law 
thinking of other countries is very strong and wi1 become much stronger 
in future. This artic1e will examine the choice of law methodology in the 
Restatement， Second， Conflict of Laws， which is one of the most important 
methodologies at least from the international perspective. Principal 
emphasis is on (1) the policy considerations which the Restatement Second 
looks on as significant factors in determining choice of law problems， and 
(2) the possibility or desirabi1ity of formulating definite and precise rules at 
the present stage of development of choice of law. In doing so， itseems 
appropriate to refer to the methodology of Professor Reese， bacause the 
central framework or underlying philosophy of the Restatement is that of 
the Reporter. Advisers， the Council and the Institute membership do not 
themselves do any of the original writing but only criticize and make 
suggestions and then ultimately either approve or reject.l) 
The American Law Institute commenced revision of the Restatement， 
Conflict of Laws in 1951. Professor Reese， Columbia Law School， was 
appointed as the Reporter. After the long preparations and discussions， the 
final Official Draft was approved for publication by the American Law 
Institute at the Annual Meeting of 1969 and was published in 1971. The 
Restatement， Second is far more than a current version of the First Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws published in 1934. It is rather a fresh treatment 
t This author wishes to thank Prof，巴ssorsvon Mehren and Trautman， Harvard Law School， for 
their invaluable assistance with this article. 
* Associate Professor of Private International Law， Facu1ty of Law， Osaka University， Visiting 
Scholar， Harvard Law School， 1974 -76. 
1) Reese， ，‘Discussion of M勾orAreas of Choice of Law"， Academie de Droit International: 111 
Recueil desCours， 312，320 (1964-1). 
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of Conflict of Laws “in basic analysis and technique， inthe position taken 
on a host of issues， in the elaboration of the commentary and addition of 
Reporter's Notes."2) It was written during the time of turmoil of American 
Conflict of Laws. Where this revolution wil1 lead us as yet unclear. The 
Restatement. Second itself does not mark the end of the road.3) Never崎
theless， the Restatement Second is having and wil1 have an enormous impact 
on American choice of law. 
1 Choice of Law Principles in the Restatement， Second 
According to Professor Reese~ al rules of law， and choice of law rules are 
no exception， are the product of po1icies.4) It is al値importantto identify 
the basic po1icies that underlie the area. Choice of law rules should be the 
product of these policies.5) Therefore， it is the po1icy which first comes to 
light.6) What are the basic po1icies which under1ie the choice of law rules of 
the Restatement Second? In other words， what are the basic factors which 
should guide a court in deciding choice of law questions and formulating 
rules for choice of law? This is stated in Restatement， Second， Conflict of 
Laws S 6.
S 6 Choice of Law Principles 
(1) A court， subject to constitutional restrictions， wil1 fol1ow a statutory 
directive of its own state on choice of law. 
(2) When there is no such directive， the factors relevant to the choice of the 
applicable rule of law include 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems， 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum， 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative 
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue， 
2) Restatement， Second， ConfJict of Laws vi (1971) (Introduction by Professor Wechsler). 
3) Reese， 72 Colum. L. Rev. 219 (1972) (Forword to the Symposium on the R巴statement
(Second) of ConfJict of Laws.) 
4の)R巴ese久，
(1963). 
5) Reese， supra note 1， at340. 
6) Reese，“Choice of Law : Rules or Approach，" 57 Cornell L. Rev. 315， 318 (1972). 
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(d) the protection of justified expectations， 
(e) the basic policies under1ying the particular field of law， 
(f) certainty， predictability and uniformity of resu1t， and 
13 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
The basic factors in ~ 6 which a court should consider in deciding the 
applicable law， are much the same as the basic policies that Professor 
Cheatham and Professor Reese enumerated in their artic1e in 1952 entit1ed 
“Choice of the App1icab1e Law".7) These policies are reproduced in the 
later artic1e of Professor Reese and in his lectures at Hague Academy.8) 
Only two of his ten original po1icies have been abandoned in the Restate-
ment Second ~ 6. These are (a) the policy that the court should apply its 
own local law unless there is good reason for not doing so and (b) the po1icy 
that the court should seek to attain justice in the individual case. A1though 
why these two policies were eliminated is not c1ear，9) we can conc1ude that 
the Restatement， Second， Conf1ict of Laws， basically adopted the 
methodology of Professor Reese， the Reporter of the Restatement Second. 
Some of the policies in ~ 6 (2)， especially ~ 6 (2)皿作)and (c) were almost 
completely neglected in the First Restatement， in which simplicity and 
uniformity were the dominant policies in deciding choice of law problems. 
These policies may require a court to examine the content and policies of 
the relevant local law rules of the interested states. And this may impose 
heavy burdens on the court， aswe wi1 see later， but it produces appropriate 
7) 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959 (1952). 
8) These policies are: 
(1) The Court must follow the dictates of its own legislature provid巴dthat these dictates are con-
stitutional; (2) Choice of Law rules should be designed. to m昌kethe international and interstate 
systems work well; (3) The court should apply its own local law unless there is good reason for not 
doing so; (4) The court should consider the purpose of its r巴1巴，vantlocal law rule in determining 
whether to apply its own law or th巴 lawof another state; (5) Choice of law rules should seek to 
achieve certainty， predictability and uniformity of result; (6) The court should seek to apply the law 
of the state of dominant interest; (8) Choice of law rules should be simple and easy to apply; (9) The 
court should seek to further the fundamental po1icy underlying the locallaw field involved; (10) The 
court should seek to attain justice in the individual case. Reese， supra note 4， at682 -690; Reese， 
supra note 1， at340 -353. 
9) According to Dr. Morris， presumably b巴causethese two policies did not find favor with 
the Institute. He says that few will mourn the dropping of these two. Morris， Book Rev~巴w，'‘Law
and Reason Triumphant or How Not to Review a Restatement，“21 Am. J. Comp. L. 322， 323 (1973). 
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solutions of choice of law problems which were often sacrificed in favour of 
simplicity and uniformity of result under the system of the First Restate-
ment.10) 
There are many factors in S 6， and it may be helpful to reduce them to a 
more manageable number. According to the Comment b to S 145，也e
factors listed in Subsection (2) of the rule of S 6 can be divided into five 
groups. One group is concerned with the fact that in multistate cases it is 
essential that the rules of decision promote mutually harmonious and 
bene自cialrelationships in the interdependent community， federal or inter-
national ( s 6(2)ー(a).The second group focuses upon the purposes， po1icies， 
aims and objectives of each of the competing local1aw rules urged to govern 
and upon the concern of the potentially interested states in having their 
rules applied. The factors in this second group are at times referred to as 
“state interests" or as appertaining to an “interested state" (s 6 (2)-(b)， (c). 
The third group involves the needs of the parties， namely the protection of 
their justified expectations and certainty andpredictability of result. 
(s 6(2)ー(d)，(f)). The fourth group is directed to implementation of the 
basic po1icies underlying the particular field oflaw， such as torts or contracts 
10) See von Mehren“The Renvoi and Its Relation to Various Approaches to th巴Choiceof Law 
Problem，" xxth C巴nturyComparative and Conflicts Law 380， 385 (1961). According to Professor von 
Mehren， the important policies under the systems ofthe First Restatement were simplicity， uniformity 
and the avoidance of forum shopping. Id， see also， von Mehren and Trautman， The Law of Multistate 
Problems， 60-65， 482-86， 512-13 (1965). 
Professor von Mehren also suggests that choice of law rules should be responsive to at least two 
fundamental 0匂ectives:first， choice of law rules must provid巴themost appropriate or apt solution 
which can achieve“a wise and just accomodation of the interests of th巴variousconcerned com-
munities" and take into account “the legit加 ateexp巴ctationsof the persons involved"; and second， 
choice of law rules seek to ensure uniformity of outcome regardless of the forum. In his view， the 
notion of aptness is today clearly almost universally viewed as the stronger policy， and the Restate-
ment Second !i6 isan巴xamplewhich ref1ects thepreference for apt solutions to decisional harmony. 
von Mehren，“Special Substantive Rules For Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in Con-
temporary Choice of Law Methodology，" 88 H紅v.L. Rev. 347， 349-355 (1ヲ74).
However， according to his opinion， the ~巴statement Second does not sugg巴stany principled 
basis， for example， toresolve the clash between policies underlying specific domestic rules， and more 
general policy of certainty， predictabiJity and uniformity of result. The need for additional guidance 
is felt， but what is offered takes the somewhat evasive form of “a secondary statement in black letter 
setting forth the choice of law the courts will ‘usually' make in given situations". So Professor von 
Mehren concludes that the Restatement Second does not resolve the difficulties and tensions that 
policy-based approches encounter. von Mehren，“Le Second ‘Restatement of the Conflict of Laws"~ 
101 Journal du droit international815，818 (1974). See， also， von Mehr巴n，‘RecentTrends in Choice 
of-Law Methodology，" 60 Cornell L. Rev. 927，963 -64 (1975). 
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(s 6(2)・(e))，and the fifth group is concerned with the needs of judicial 
administration， namely with ease in the determination and application of 
the law to be applied (s 6(2)-(g)). These policies can also be devided into 
two groups from another point of view. One group is basically directed to 
the various domestic law policies (s 6(2)ー(b)，(c)， (e). The other group is 
concerned with the policies deriving from the fact that the situation involves 
more than one jurisdiction (s 6(2)-(a)， (d)， (f)).11) 
The Restatement Second does not mention false conf1icts. So it is not 
c1ear whether these policy considerations are also applied to false conf1ict 
cases as well as true conf1ict cases. However， a ve巧rinteresting statement can 
be found in Comment i to S 145. It reads:“When certain contacts involving 
a tort are located in two or more states with identicallocallaw rules on the 
issue in question， the case wi1 be treated for choice-of-law purposes as if 
these contacts were grouped in a single state." This means that when the 
relevant laws of the states involved are the same， there is no conf1ict between 
the laws. When there is no conf1ict between the laws， there is no need to 
make a choice of law.12) That approach is undoubtedly one way of eliminat-
ing so“cal1ed false conf1icts. It seems to me that the choice of law principle 
in S 6 wi1 be applied to al multistate situations except the situation stated 
above， whether they involve with false conf1icts or not. 
The methodology of the Restatement Second has a great resemblance to 
Professor Leflar's“choice-influencing considerations" .13) Leflar himself 
wrote in his artic1e that the list of the Restatement Second S 6 would be 
substantially complete， ifthe policy of applying the better rule of law were 
11) Trautman，“Chronil吐uede jurisprudence des Etats-Unis d'Amerique" 102 Journal du Droit 
International 371， 372 (1975); Reese， supra note 6， at322. 
12) Leflar， "The Torts Provisions of the Restatem巴nt(Second)，" 72 Colum. L. Rev. 267， 274-
275 (1972). See also generally， Ehrenzweig，“False Conflicts and the Better Rule: Threat and 
Promise in Multistate Tort Law，" 53 Va. L. Rev. 847 (1967); Leflar，“True‘False Conflicts' et Alia，" 
48 B. U. L. Rev. 164 (1968). 
13) Professor Leflar lists five choice-influencing considerations. The list is shorter th間 thatof the 
Restatement. It embraces the following factors: (1) predictabi1ty of resu1t; (2) maintenance of 
interstate and international ord巴r; (3) simplification of the judical task; (4) advancement of the 
forum's governmental interests; (5) application of the better rule of law， Leflar， American Conflicts 
Law 241-265 (1968). 
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added.14) Leflar's choice-influencing considerations may be easier to apply 
thanRestatement Second 96. Although the better-law approach should be 
taken into account in explaining decisions， and the influence of the better 
law in choice of law has been recognized as an inevitable psychological 
reaction in marginal cases，15) better rule of law can not be accepted in its 
original form. The concept of the better rule is too flexible and the better 
law is often difficu1t to find， unless objective standards of the better rule can 
be made c1ear. It wil1 also serve courts as a pretext for applying its own law. 
Probably the most important question is the way in which courts will 
take into account the factors listed in 96 in deciding the governing law. In 
the Comments to 9 6 there is no definite guide as to the way particular 
choice of law problems should be determined in the light of these factors 
and what degree of importance or weight should generally be given to each 
factor. It is only suggested in Comment c to 96 that varying weight will be 
given to a particular factor or to a group of factors in different areas of 
choice of law. For example， the policy in favor of effectuating the relevant 
policies of the state of dominant interest (6(2)ー(c))is presumably given 
predominant weight in the rule that transfers of interest in land are governed 
by the law that would be applied by the courts of situs ( 9 223-243). On the 
other hand， the policies in favor of protecting the justified expectations of 
the parties (9 6(2)-(d)) and of effectuating the basic policy underlying the 
particular field of law (96(2)ー(e))come to the fore in the rule that the 
parties can choose the law to govern their contract subject to certain limita-
tions (9 187). 
Thus， informulating choice of law rules， it is necessary for the court to 
determine what policy or policies should be given dominant weight in a 
14) Lef1ar， supra note 12， at271ー 72. 80m巴 courtshave followed Professor Lef1ar's choice-
inf1uencing considerations approach. Clark v. Clark， 107 N. H. 351，222 A. 2d 205 (1966); Conklin v. 
Horner， 38 Wis. 2d 468， 157 N. W. 2d 579 (1968); Zelinger v. 8tate 8and & Gravel Co， 38 Wis. 2d 98， 
156 N. W. 2d 466 (1968); Hea也 v.Zellrner， 35 Wis. 2d 578， 151 N. W. 2d 664 (1967)， Woodward v. 
8tewart， 243 A. 2d 917 (1968); Mitchell v. Craft， 211 80 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Milkovich v. 8aari， 
203 N. W. 2d 408 (1973). It is interesting to note that泊 thesecases， the courts appu'巴dthe forum's 
law as the better rule of law. 8e巴Cavers，Conf1ict of Laws Round Table，“The V丘lueof Principled 
Preferences，" 49 Tex. L. Rev. 211，215 (1971). 
15) Cavers， supra not巴14at 215. 
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particular choice of law field. Each chapter in the Restatement Second tries 
to identify them， but it seems to me in general that application of the law of 
the state ¥vith dominant interest is actual1y given the greatest priority in the 
Restatement Second (see ~ 6 Comment f). Another important question in 
formulating choice of law rules is how the court accommodates the policies 
in ~ 6 when they point， asthey often do， indifferent directions. Choice 
of law rules should tepresent these conflicting policies. Therefore， the 
effectiveness of the methodology of ~ 6 principal1y depends on whether 
black letter rules， comments， or illu~trations of various chapters in the 
Restatement Second can afford the court the best information on these 
points. Each section of the Restatement Second tries to state some 
additional guides as to the way in which the court should take into account 
the po1icies of ~ 6 in each choice of law field. However， itseems to me that 
the effort is not so successful. 
Choice of law isヲaccordingto Professor Reese， sti1 an undeveloped area 
and it can not be said that there is always agreement on what choice of law 
po1icies are entitled to the greatest weight in each particular field and how to 
accomodate conflicting policies. Therefore， various kinds of rules have been 
deduced on the basis of ~ 6 of the Restatement Second. In some fields， 
according to Professor Reese， it is possible to formulate definite and precise 
rules because there is agreement on these points. In other areas， for the lack 
of such agreement， we can not present definite rules and have to be satisfied 
with an approach. In these areas， the court must look in each case to the 
underlying factors themselves in order to arrive at a decision which wi1l best 
accommodate them (~6 ， Comment c). 1 think it is possible and useful to 
c1assify the provisions of the Restatement， Conflict of Laws from this stand-
point， that is， "rules or approach'¥The remaining part of this artic1e wi1l be 
directed to this problem. 
n Definite Rules or the Most Significant Relationship Approach 
1. Definite Rules 
16) Restatement， Second， Conf1ict of Laws e 223， Comment a (1971). 
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First， the field where definite and precise rules are formulated in the 
Restatement Second， wi1l be examined. The most typical example is found 
in the provisions on property， especially land. S 223(1) provides that 
whether a conveyance transfers an. interest in land and the nature of the 
interest transferred are determined by the law that would be applied by the 
court of situs. Comment a of the Section explaines that the rule is derived 
from those principles looking to furtherance of the needs of the interstate 
and international systems， app1ication of the law of the state of dominant 
interest， protection of justified expectations， certainty， predictabi1ity and 
uniformity of resu1t and ease in the determination and app1ication of the law 
to be app1ied.16) This rule is sufficiently precise to permit the courts to 
apply it in the decision of a case without reference to the factors which 
underlie it (96 Comment c). This is because almost al the choice of law 
considerations point in the same direction， that is， the application of the 
whole law of the situs. These simple， broad and al“embracing rules were 
very common in the Restatement First. In the Restatement Second， 
however， they are rather exceptional. According tQ Professor Reese， inthe 
artic1e in 1963， by and large， fairly definite choice of law rules are stated 
with respect to status， corporations and property.17) But in Comment c， 
9 6 ofthe Restatement Second Proposed Official Draft， which was pub1ished 
in 1967， status was e1iminated from the list， and finally the 1971 Official 
Draft also struck out corporations. Therefore， the only chapter 9 (property) 
remained as an area in which definite rules can be stated. This shows that 
the antipathy against the rules of the First Restatement， especially in 
contracts and torts which are simple， broad and all-embracing， has spread 
and extended over the other choice of law fields. But Dr. Morris expressed 
his surprise why more definite and precise rules were not laid down in the 
chapter on status especially marriage.18) 
In any event， definite rules are not generally adopted in the Restatement 
Second， especially in tort and contract. According to Professor Reese the 
choice of law rules in the First Restatement were bad in two respects. First， 
17) Re巴se，supra note 4， at694. 
18) Morris， supra note 9， at327. 
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they did not properly give effect to the policies involved. They are derived 
from the vested rights theory， which gives litle consideration to the 
mu1tistate and local law policies that are likely involved in a choice of law 
question in tort and contract.19) Second， they are too broad and al-
embracing. According to Professor Reese， bad rules may well be worse than 
no rule at al. There are many different kinds of contracts . and a vastly 
greater mu1titude of issues relating to contracts. Experience has shown that 
these large and complicated areas cannot adequately be handled by a few 
simple rules.20) What is needed instead is a large number of rules that 
are each directed to a relatively narrow situation.21) Experience to date is 
not sufficient to permit the formulation of many such rules. Courts and 
writers should attempt to formulate such good rules. And indeed， the task 
has been begun. A handful of narrow choice of law rules which have the 
overwhelming support of the courts have been developed. For instance， 
issues relating to details of performance of a contract are determined by the 
local rule of the place of performance (e 206). This is an example of precise 
and definite rules.22) And other rules have been suggested in isolated deci-
sions and legal articles.23) However， genera11y speaking， at the present time， 
it is impossible to formulate narrow and precise rules in every choice of law 
field. 
2. The Most Significant Relationship Approach 
Pending the development of rules， the courts should look in each case to 
19) Reese， supra note 6， at320. 
20) Id， at320. However， according to Professor Reese， this does not mean that simple and al -
embracing choice of law rules can not be defended. There may be other situations where application 
of a simple， all-embracing rule of choice of law is supported by an overriding need for uniformity of 
result. This is the pr泊四justification of th巴rulethat issues of succession to movables are determined 
by the law of the state where the decedent was domiciled at t註etime of his death (g260). 
21) Reese， supra note 4 at 698. These narrow choice of law rules which are directed to， atmost， 
only a relatively few issues， will require that two or more issues involved should each be determined 
by th巴rulesof different states. See generally， Reese， "Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice 
ofLaw，" 73 Colum. L. Rev. 58 (1973). 
22) Reese， supra note 6 at 321， 327. lt seems to me that other examples of these narrow and 
precise rules in the Restatement Second can be seen in the provisions of e 169， e 184， e 203 and e 269. 
23) Reese， supra note 6 at 321. He cites Judge Fuld's concurring opinion in Tooker v. Lopez， 24 
N. Y. 2d 569， 585， 249 N. E. 394， 404， 301 N. Y. S. 2d 519， 532-33 (1969)， and Professor 
Rosenberg's opinion， Comments on Reich v. Purcell， 15 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 641， 646-647 (1968). 
20 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW fNo.24 
the basic po1icies involved and strive to reach the resu1t that would best 
implement these po1icies. In such situations we can only apply an 
approach. It is doubtful whether we are now in a position to frame many 
good choice of law rules in either tort or contract.24) Both fields are vast 
and many segments remain relatively unexplored. The most typical example 
of this approach can be found in S 145. 
s 145 The General Principle 
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort 
are determined by the locallaw of the state which， with respect to that 
issue， has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties under the principles stated in S 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles ofs 6 to 
determine the law applicable to an issue inc1ude: 
(a) the place where the injury occurred， 
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred， 
(c) the domici1， residence， nationality， place of incorporation and place 
of business of the parties， and 
(d) the place where the relationship， ifany， between the parties is 
centered. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative import国
ance with respect to the particular issue. 
The rule of this Section states a principle applicable to al1 torts and to 
al issues in tort (s 145 Comment c). The black Ietter rule and the accom-
panying comments are phrased in terms of great generality and wilI not give 
the courts a ready-made solution to any particular case. It is believed， 
however， that the rule and the comments state the basic factors to be 
considered and thus provide the tool for the fashioning ofsatisfactory rules 
of choice of law戸)In this sense， this is not a rule in a strict meaning， which 
24) Reese， supra note 1， at399. 
25) Id， at399. As to the torts provisions of the Restatement Second， see， Lef1ar， supra not巴 12;
Comment，“The Second Conflicts Restatemen士ofTorts: A Caveat，" 51 Calif. L. Rev. 763 (1963); 
Ehrenzweig，“The Most Significant Relationship in the Conflict of Laws of Torts -Law and Reason 
versus Restatement Second，" 28 Law & Comtemp. Prob. 700 (1963). 
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once applied will lead the court to a conclusion. It is an approach as well as 
S 6， and this approach is usual1y called “the most significant re1ationship 
approach." 
The factors listed in S 6(2) vary somewhat in importance from field to 
fieid. It is said that the important factors in tort are the needs of inter-
state and international systems， the relevant policies of the forum， the 
relevant po1icies of other interested states， and ease in the determination and 
application of the law to be applied.26) This means that a court usually 
needs to consider on1y these po1icies in determining the state of the most 
significant relationship under the princip1es stated in S 6.However， we can 
not say that these important policies are clearly reflected in the black 1etter 
rule of S 145 and the accompanying comments. Furthermore， it is difficu1t 
to understand why the factor of ease in the determination and application of 
the law is so important in tort， because the application of the most 
significant relationship approach is not so easy and simple to app1y. It seems 
to me that the relevant policies of the forum and other interested states are 
actual1y given the greatest weight in the Comments to S 145. 
The concerned jurisdictions which should be taken into account in 
applying S 6 to determine the app1icable law in torts are stated in S 145(2) 
(a)一(d).The question is the way in which courts wil1 consider the relative 
importance of these concerned jurisdictions in determming the state of the 
most significant relationship. According to Comments to S 145， the relative 
importance of these contacts depends on three elements.27) The first 
element is the purpose of a tort law. For example， ifthe primary purpose of 
the tort law involved， isto deter or punish misconduct， asmay be true 
of rules permiting the recovery of damages for alienation of affections， 
the state where the conduct took p1ace， may be the state of the dominant 
interest. On the other hand， when the tort rule isdesigned primarily to com凶
pensate the victim， the state of injury may have the greatest interest in the 
26) Restatement， Second， Conf1ict of Laws ~ 145， Comment b (1ヲ71).
27) ~ 379-(3) (now ~ 145・(2))of the Tentative Draft clearly stated:“ln det巴rmmingthe relative 
importance of the contacts， the forum will consider the issues， the character of the tort and relevant 
purposes of the tort rules involved." 
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matter， at least if the victim lives there. But it is not always necessary to 
examine the purpose of the rule. Comment c states that it is frequently 
unnecesary to examine the content of the rule of the interested states. This 
wil1 be so whenever. by reason of the particular circumstances one state is 
obviously that of the applicable law. However， we can not find any explana-
tion about what these particular situations are. The second element is the 
issue involved. For example， the issue involving standards of conduct wi1 be 
determined by the law of the state of injury and conduct. On the other 
hand， the issue of intra-fami1y immunity is usually determined by the law of 
the state of the spouses' common domici1. Thirdly， the relative importance 
of the contacts mentioned in S 145(2) varies somewhat with the nature of 
the tort involved. Thus， the place of injury is of particular importance in the 
case of personal injury (s 146). On the other hand， the principal10cation of 
the defendant's conduct is the most single important contact in the case of 
interference with marriage relationship (s 154). 
Thus， we can say that S 145 is not a rule in a strict sense. It only states 
答;whatfactors should be considered in arriving at a conc1usion. Though it is 
a litle more concrete than S 6， itis sti1l basically an approach. However， itis 
stated in Comment e that when the injury occurred in a single， c1early 
ascertainable state and when the conduct which caused the injury also 
occurred there， that state wi1l usually be the state of the app1icable law with 
respect to most issues involving the tort. This statement may be contrary 
to the basic approach which emphasizes the importance of the purposes of 
the law involved and the particular issue.28) 
担uchthe same approach has been taken in S 188 which states the 
applicable law for contract in the absence of effective choice by the 
parties.29) Subsection (1) of that section provides that the rights and duties 
of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local 
law of the state which， with respect to that issue， has the most significant 
relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in 
s 6. The policy of the protection of the parties is one of the important 
28) See Weintraub， Commentaryon the Conflict of Laws 210 (1971). 
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policies in contacts whereas it is of litle importance in torts.30) However， 
the relative importance of that po1icy varies somewhat from issue to issue. 
It is of considerable importance when an issue of validity of a contract， 
such as the forma1ity required to make a va1id contract， isat issue. The 
parties will usually expect that the provisions of the contract will be binding 
on them. Therefore， their expectations should not be disappointed by 
applying the law which would strike down the contract or a provision 
thereof unless the value of protecting the expectations of the parties is 
substantially outweighed in the particular case by the interest of the state 
with an inva1idating rule in having this rule applied. On the other hand， 
when an issue involves the nature of the ob1igations imposed by a contract 
upon the parties， protection of justified expectations of the parties may play 
a less significant rule in the choice of law process.31) 
Other important policies in the contract area of choice of law are the 
po1icies of the potentially interested states and the relative interests of those 
states in the determination of the particular issue.32) The states which are 
most 1ikely to be interested are those which have one or more of the 
contacts stated in ~ 188(2). These factual contacts with the transaction and 
the parties are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with 
respect to the particular issue. Therefore， we can say that the importance 
of both the purposes of the re1evant laws and the particular issue involved is 
emphasized in the determination of the state of the most significant relation-
29) When the parties have chosen the law that wi1l govern their contractual rights and duties， the 
law wi1l be app1ied， su吋ectto certain limitations (!i 187). This recognition of party autonomy is one 
of the most important changes in the contract chapter of the Restateri1ent Second. See Reese， supra 
note 1，at 368-74. 
With respect to the contracts provisions of the Restatement Second， see Rees巴，“Contractsand 
the Restatement of Conf1ict of Laws， Second，" 9 lnt'l & Comp. L. Q. 53 (1960). Ree鉛 ，supra note 1， 
at 366-385; Cavers，“R巴q巴statingth巴Conf1ictof Laws: The Chapter on Contracts，" xxth Century 
Comparative and Conf1icts Law 349 (1961); Weintraub， "The Contracts Proposals of the Second 
Restatement of Conf1ict of.Laws -A Critique，" 46 Iowa L. Rev. 713 (1961); LefIar，“Conf1ict of 
Laws， Contracts and the New Restatement，" 15 Ark. L. Rev. 163 (1961); Szold， Comments on T巴nta-
tive Draft No. 6 of the Restatement (Second) Conf1ict of Laws -Contracts， 76 Harv. L. R巴v.1524 
(1963); Braucher， lmpromptu Remarks， 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1718 (1963);Sedler，“Th巴ContractsProvi-
sions of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique，" 72 Colum. L. Rev. 329 (1972). 
30) Restatement， Second， Conf1ict of Laws !i188， Comment c (1971). 
31) ld. 
32) Restat巴ment，Second， Conf1ict of Laws !i188， Comment c (1971). 
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ship.33) In this sense， the approach taken in S 188 is essential1y the same as 
s 145 discussed above. 
However， assome commentators suggest，34) S 188 may be seen to have 
some aspects of a jurisdiction-selecting rule. It is said as wel1 as in torts 
that it is frequently not necessaη1 to paydeliberate attention to the purpose 
soughtノtobe achieved by the relevant contract rules of the interested states. 
This will be so whenever by reason of the particular circumstances one 
state is obviously that of the app1icable law. But， there is no explanation 
of what the particular circumstances are. Moreover， ifthe palce of negotia-
tion and the place of performance are the same， that state will usual1y be 
the state of most significant relationship (s 188(3))， because a state having 
these contacts wi1 usual1y be the state that has the greatest interest in the 
determination of issues arising under the contract (Comment 0. However， 
it is somewhat difficu1t to imagine the situations in which a state can be the 
state of the most significant relationship without knowing the contents 
andpurposes of the relevant laws of that state.35) At any event， asfar as 
these expressions are concerned， the rule of S 188 is framed in terms of 
facLual contact and not based on the po1icy-oriented approach. This is true 
of al1 sections， but S 6 isa1ways involved. 
3. Rules or Approach 
It seems appropriate here to examine the question whether we should 
have rules or approach. According to Professor Reese， this is the principal 
question in choice oflawtoday.36) Rules are emp10yed in most areas oflaw. 
The advantages that rules bring are certainty and predictability， and the 
33) Professor Cavers suggested in an article written in 1961 that th巴RestatementSecond should 
make clear that the relevance and importance of the contacts can only be determined in the Iight 
of the particular issue before the court. He further suggested that the Restatem巴ntshould point out 
that determination of the state of most significant relationship can not be made without giving con-
sideration to the contents and purposes of the relevant IocaI Iaw rules of the int巴restedstates. Cavers， 
supra note 29， at356-57. The black Ietter rule and comments of 332(b) (now e 188) were amended 
to incorporate these suggestions， Reese， supra note 1， at378. They are aIso refIected in the torts 
provisions of the Restatement Second. Id，394. See supra 10. 
34) Sedler， supra note 29， at298-99; Weintraub， supra note 28， at277. 
35) Cavers， supra note 29， at356; Weintraub， supra note 28， at277. 
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facilitation of the judicial task. On the other hand， the task of a judge is 
peculiarly difficult when he is told without further direction to apply the 
law of the state with the greatest concem in the decision of the particular 
issue. There are four disadvantages in using only an approach and not rules. 
They are: (1) the difficulty of ascertaining what policies underlie the 
relevant laws of potentially interested states， (2) the difficulty of defining 
the po1icy to the point of being able to determine whether it would or would 
not be furthered by the rule's application in a case involving foreign facts， 
(3) the difficu1ty of determing which of the states involved is that of primary 
concern， and (4) if the court were to find that two or more of these policies 
were approximately equal strength， the further problem of determining why 
one of these policies should be furthered at the expense of the other. 37) 
Professor Reese continues that the difficulties involved in applying the 
law of the state with the greatest concern in the decision of the particular 
issue are well il1ustlated by the experience of the New York Court of 
Appeals. He cites a series of decisions of the New York Court of Appeals 
since Babcock v. J ackson. 38) He furthermore insists that in at Ieast most 
areas of law， the cOl1stant aim of courts has been to translate policies into 
rules as quickly as possible， because rules are more precise and hence provide 
greater certainty and predictability and are also far easier for the courts to 
apply. The development of rules should be as much as an objective in choice 
of law as it is in other areas. Professor Reese conc1udes we should have 
rules.39) We should have narrow and definite ruies which are based on 
36) Reese， supra note 6， at315. Professor Rosenberg also says: "The disagreement today is 
whether any choice-of-law rules can be fashioned， however narrow， and however sensitive to the 
importance of taking into account of the contents of the rejected and the chosen Iaws. i belive that 
useful rules can be drawn." Rosenberg， Comment on Reich v. PurcelJ， 15 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 641， 642 
(1968). See generally， Cramton， Currie and Kay， Conflict of Laws 352-359 (2d ed. 1975); Rees巴
and Rosenberg， Conflict of Laws 603-604 (6th ed. 1971); von Mehren and Trautman， supra note 10， 
at 2ヲ9-304.
37) Reese， supra note 6， at317-18. See also， Ro唱enberg，Two Views on Kell v. Henderson， 67 
Colum. L. Rev. 459， 464 (1967). 
38) Babcock v. Jackson， 12 N. Y. 2d 473， 191 N. E. 2d 279，240 N. Y. S. 2d 743 (1963); Miller 
v. Miller， 22 N. Y. 2d 12，237 N. E. 2d 877，290 N. Y. S. 2d 734 (1968); Macey v. Rezbicki， 18 N. Y. 
2d 289，221 N. E. 2d 380，274 N. Y. S. 2d 591 (1966). Reese， supra note 6， at318. 
39) Reese， supra note 6， at319 
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proper choice-of-law considerations. A good choice of law rule that works 
well in the great majority of situations should be app1ied even in a case 
where it might not reach ideal resu1ts. Good rules， 1ike other advantages， 
have their price叩}
This position was supported in Neumeier v. Kuehner. The New York 
Court of Appeals questioned the uti1ity of interest analysis and turned to 
“narrow choice of law rules". Chief Judge Fuld， speaking for the court， 
stated: 
When， in Babcock v. Jackson (citation omitted)， we rejected the 
mechanical place of injury rule in personal injury cases because it fai1ed 
to take account of underlying po1icy considerations， we were wil1ing to 
sacrifice the certainty provided by the old rule for the more just， fair and 
practical result that may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to 
the law of the jurisdiction which has greatest concern with， or interest in， 
the specific issue raised in the 1itigation (citation omitted). In con-
sequence of the change effected -and this was to be anticipated -our 
decisions in multi四statehighway accident cases， particularly in those 
involving guest-host controversies， have， itmust be acknowledged， lacked 
consistency. This stemmed， inpart， from the circumstance that it is 
frequently difficult to discover the purposes or po1icies underlying the 
relevant local law rules of the respective jurisdictions involved. It is even 
more difficu1t， assuming that these purposes or po1icies are found to 
conflict， to determine on some principled basis which should be given 
effect at the expense of the others. 
40) Reese， supra note 6， at322， 334. See also Professor Rosenberg's st呈ternent.He says;“While 
1 would not want to be understood as saying that a bad rule is better than no rule at al， 1 do assert 
that a choice of Iaw rule need not achieve perfect justice every t出 eit is invoked in order to be 
preferable to theno-rule approach." Rosenberg， supra not巴36，at 644. 
On the contrary， Profl免巴s鉛or路svon M巴由hr犯巴nand Tr悶au以I此trn在鉛ns路ay杭:
various rnu叫lt討is託ta託t巴poli捻ci記巴sderiving frorn s坑t畠託t巴泊t巴r巴stsand inter巴stsof individuals rnay b巴adifficuIt 
one， and certainly no forrnulation of criteria in the abstract， unrelated to particular factual contexts， 
seerns to b巴rneaningfulat this stage of廿1巴d巴veloprnentof the law." von Mehren and Trautrnan， supra 
note 10 at 299. They further suggest:“Although rules ought to be as sirnple as possible， workable 
rules -rules that provide satisfactory and rational solutions -often rnust be cornplex. Th加1鴎巴cωornplex対it勿y 
i泊nh巴釘re閃s泊 t白heproblern to which rules are direct旬ed.プ，刊
results is not worth the price pa泊id."Id. at 303-04. 
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The single al酬encompassingmle which called， inexorably， for selection 
of the law of the place of injury was discarded， and wisely， because it 
was too broad to prove satisfactory in application. There is， however， no 
reason why choice-of-law mles， more narrow than those previously 
devised， should not be successfully developed， inorder to assure a greater 
degree of predictability and uniformity， on the basis of our present 
knowledge and experience~l) 
Judge Fuld then referred to his concurring opinion in Tooker v. Lopez， 
in which he stated three principles for deciding guest statute cases， and these 
three principles were adopted by the majority in Neumeier. Though no one 
can dispute the desirability of simplicity and predictability， itis somewhat 
doubtful whether the principle adopted in Neumeier， especially mle 1， is
a happy one. 
It is important to note that Professor Reese's position taken here is 
somewhat different from that of the Restatement Second with respect to 
two points. First， Comment f to S 6 stated:“In general， itis fitting that the 
state whose interests are most deeply affected should have its local law 
41) Neumeier v. Kuehner， 31 N. Y.2d 121， 127 (1972). Three principleswhich were adapted by 
the majority in Neumi巴r訂e:
“1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state， and th巴caris 
there registered， the law of that state should control and determine the standard of care which the 
host owes to his guest. 
“2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state does not cast 
h加 inliability for that conduct， he should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would 
be imposed upon him under the tort law of the stat巴ofthe victinγs domicile. Conversely， when the 
guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law pormits recovery， the driver who has 
come泊tothat state should not -in the absence of special circumstances -be p巴rmittedto interpose 
the law ofhis state as a defense. 
“3. In other situations， when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different states， the 
mle is necessarily les cat巴gorical.Normally， the applicable mle of decision will be that of the state 
where the accident occurred but not江itcan be shown that displacing that normally applicable 
mle w巡 advancethe relevant substantive law purpo鈴 swithout impairing the smooth working of the 
mu1tistate system or producing great uncertainty for litigants. 
Id， at128. As to this case， see Symposium， Neumeier v. Kuehn巴r: A Conf1icts Conf1ict， 1 
Hofstra L. Rev. 93 (1973). 
Another recent example which stands much the same position can be found in First National 
Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek， 514 P. 2d 314 (Colo. 1973). In this case， the first two principles of 
Neumeier were adopted. 
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appiied.円 Thisseems tosuggest that application of the law of the state with 
the domillant interest is the single， most important factor in the entire 
system of choice of law of the Restatement in genera1. However， Professor 
Reese now holds the position that app1ication of greatest concern is only one 
of several choice of law policies and not necessari1y the most important. 
Second， the Comments to e 6 stated: 
i Predictabi1ty and uniformity of result. These are important values in 
al1 areas of the law. To the extent that they are aUained in choice of 
law， forum shopping wi1l be discouraged. These values can， however， be 
purchased at too great a price. In a rapidly developing area， such as 
choice of iaw， it is often more important that good rules be developed 
than that predictability and unifonnity of resu1t should be assured 
through continued adherence to existing rules. . . 
j Ease in the determination and app1ication of the law to be app1ied. 
IdeaIIy， choice-of・.lawruies should be simple and easy to apply. This 
po1icy should not be overemphasized， since it is obviously of greater 
importance that choice-of-law rules lead to desirable results. 
On the other hand， aswe have already seen， somewhat greater emphasis 
is now placed on the policies of certainty， predictability and ease of app1ica辱
tion by Professor Reese in order to avoid ad hoc decisions and to fonnulate 
definite and precise rules. It can be said that these attitudes are based on the 
idea that the judicial decisions since Babcock v. J ackson have not always 
produced satisfactory results. 
In any event， according to Professor Reese， we should try to fonnulate 
definite and precise rules. And he suggests some examples of these good 
rules. It seems that there are two. kinds of good rules. In some situations， 
the law of a particular state may be applied because the state is that of 
greatest concern by reason of a particular contact irrespective of alI other 
considerations induding the content of its relevant locallaw.42) Such rules 
may be found in e 206 and e 223 as we have already seen.43) And he also 
suggests a rule that the law of the common domici1 ofguest and host driver 
42) Reese， supra note 6， at326-27. 
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should be applied to determine whether the guest should be required to 
show more than ordinary neg1igence in order to recover from the host.44) 
1 can not examine here whether these jurisdiction-selecting mles work well 
in the great majority of situations. 1 only indicate that there are some strong 
dissents against formulating this kipd of jurisdiction・selectingmle.45) 
Professor Reese admits that there are not so many issues as to which one 
state will be that of greatest concern by reason of a particular contact alone. 
There wi1 be other issues as to which a state will， inthe great majority of 
situations， occupy this position if in addition to a particular contact， ithas 
a particular local law mle.46) For example， the state where a person acts 
43) See supra 7 -8. However， according to Professor Lef1ar， the hard-and-fast situs rule on land 
can not b巴justified.He suggests役lata forum which is the domicil of al the parties， orthe situs of 
consideration promised or is the place where promised transactions are to occur， or where some 
burdensome consequence may be incurred， can have interests as r巴alas those of situs state. In addi-
tion， there is at least some room for a deliberate prefer巴ncefor what is the better rule of law. There-
fore， there can be cas巴sin which投lepolicy considerations of advancement of the forum's govern-
mental interests and application of the better rule of law will outweigh the policy of predictability 
and uniformity of result which supports the situs rule on land. L巴flar，Am号ricanConf1icts Law 
409-411 (1968). 
Professor Weintraub also vigorously attacks the widely recognizea situs rule. He says that the 
situs has an interest in applying its own law only when choice of law affects the use of the land. In 
other situations， especially where no third-party interest involved， and there is a dispute between 
original parties， the situs rarely has a domina.'lt I!1terest. So he suggests a functional approach similar 
to白atin choice of law problems involving torts and contracts. Weintraub， supra not巴28，at 338. 
See also， von Mehren and Trautman， supra note 10， at193-200. 
44) Reese， supra note 6， at328. He admits that the state of injury may have a legitimate泊terest
in having its own rule applied in such situations. However， he says that this interest is unlikely to 
exceed in intensity that of the state of common domicile. Id‘But see Conklin v. Horner， 38 Wis. 2d 
468，157 N. W. 2d 579 (1968); Milkovich v. Sa釘i，295 Minn. 155，203 N. W. 2d 408 (1ヲ73).In these 
ca鈴s，some courts have applied the law of the place of injury. See also Trautman， Two Views on Kell 
v.日巴nderson，67 Colum. L. Rev. 465 (1967). 
45) Professor Trautman doubts whether Judge Fuld's first rule (se巴supranote 41) will be follow-
ed in a case in which th巴parties'domicil and the place of registration of the car is主statewith a guest 
statute， and the state of the plac巴 ofaccident casts the driver in liability. He says:“lt is quite con-
ceivable that a proper巴xaminatiollof the competing policies would lead to imposing liability und己主
the law of the place of accident. A strong policy of compensating al victims of automobile accidents， 
including guests， inrecog 
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wil1 almost certainly have the greatest concern in the application of its tort 
rule relating to standards of conduct， provided that the act did not measure 
up to the pertinent standard.47) And capacity is another issue where it may 
be possible to state a precise rule to the effect that a person will be held to 
have capacity to contract if he has such capacity under the law of the state 
of his domicil. Professor Reese also suggests a rule that a person who acts 
and causes injury in the state of injury in the state of his domicil should not 
be subjected to a higher measure of responsibility in tort than would be 
imposed by the law of that state戸) These rules seem to me less objection-
able in the sense that they take into account the local and mu1tistate policies 
担 theparticular issue. However， itseems to me that these situations may 
be found to be false conflicts in terms of functional or interest analysis. In 
this sense， the process of formulating narrow and precise rules of this kind 
is somewhat simi1ar to that of finding false conflicts. In any event， accord-
ing to Professor Reese， itis doubtful that we are now in a position to form 
good choice of law rules in a11 choice of law field especially in either tort or 
contract. Both fields are vast and many of their segments remain relatively 
unexplored. Pending the development of rules， the courts should look in 
each case to the basic policies involved S 6 and strive to reach the resu1t that 
would best implement these policies.49) 
II Intermediate Stage 
There is an intermediate stage between the time when decisions are 
derived directly from the underlying policies and the time when precise rules 
are formulated. According to Professor Reese， itmay be that at the present 
time most areas of choice of law can be usefully covered by principles of this 
sort.50) 1 wil1 examine some examples of this sort of rules in the Restate-
ment Second. The provisions of S 146， and S 147 state that issues arising 
from tortious injuries to persons or to tangible property are determined by 
47) Id， at328-29. 
48) Id， at330-32. 
49) Id， at321-22. 
50) Id， at324. 
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the law of the state where the injury occurred unless some other state 
happens to be that of the most significant re1ationship under the princip1e 
of S 6. And with respect to multistate invasion of privacy， the 10callaw of 
the state where the plaintiff was domiciled wi1l usually be applied (s 153). 
In the contract area， inthe absence of effective choice of law by the parties， 
the validity of a contract for the transfer ofan interest in land and the rights 
created thereby are determined by the local law of the state where the 1and 
is situated， and the validity of a contract for the repayment of money 
1ent and the right created thereby are determined by the locallaw of the 
state where the contract requires that repayment be made， unless some 
other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in 
s 6to the transaction and the parties (s189， s 195). 
These provisions indicate that the 1aw of a particular state will usual1y 
be applied with respect to a particular issue or a particular kind of tort or 
contract. In this sense， they provide some certainty and predictabi1ity as 
well as some gilidance for the courts.51) It may no longer always be 
necessary for courts and lawyers to look to the under1ying policies in arriving 
at a decision.52) On the other hand， these provisions presuppose that some 
other state wi1 be the state of applicable law in certain exceptional situa-
tions. Whether such an exceptional situation exists should be determined in 
the light of the factors set forth in S 6.53) These provisions may be similar to 
Professor Cavers's principles of preference， asfar as they are the principles 
at intermediate stage between precise rules and approach. The essential 
difference between the Restatement Second principles and Cavers's principles 
of preference are that the former is in part jurisdiction-selecting and on the 
other hand the latter are entirely dependant upon the content of the relevant 
laws of the potentially interested states.54) 
Next， some examples of rules which are a lit1e more definite will be 
51) Id， at323. However， Professor LefIar doubts whether these provisions of the Restatement 
Second are much help. Heぬysthat they seem to g!ve a delusive appearance of certainty， which， in
the torts choice of law area， isneither r巴alnor desirable， LefIar， supra note 12， at273-74. 
52) Reese， supra note 6， at324. 
53) Id， at325. 
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examined. For example， e 283 provides: 
S 283 Validity of Marriage 
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the 
state which， with respect to the particular issue， has the most 
significant relationship to t.he spouses and the marriage under the 
pr.inciples stated in S 6.
(2) A marriage which sati.sfies the requirements of the state where the 
marriage was contracted will eve:rywhere be recognized as va1id unless 
it violates the strong public policy of another state whichhad the most 
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of 
the marriage. 
Comment b states that the protection of the justified expectations of the 
parties is of considerable importance in the case of marriage. And the need 
for protecting the expectations of the parties gives importance in tum to the 
values of certainty， predictability and uniformity of result. Protection of the 
justified expectations of the parties is also a basic policy under1ying the field 
of marriage. Another facior 明点ichis of great importance in the area of 
choice of law with respect to marriage is implementation of the relevant 
policies of the state with the dominant interest in the determination of the 
particular issue.、Fromthese po1icy considerations， the following rule can be 
stated. (1) A marriage which meets the requirements of the state of celebra-
tion will usual1y be held valid eve:rywhere. This result is supported primarily 
by the poHcy consideration of the protection of the justified expectation 
54) Professor Reese says that he agrees with Professor Cavers's opinion in the following basic 
points: (1) We should avoid ad hoc decision and achieve whatev巴rcertainty and predictability is 
possible in choice of law; (2) difficult choice of law questions ar巴 unlikelyto be resolved by the 
process of construing and interpreting the relevant laws of each potentially interested st且tes;(3) in the 
quest for certaLllty and predictability， the court should start with f1exible general principles rather 
thaIl precise rules. However， he prefers the prLrlciples of the R巴statementSecond to the principles 
of preference of Professor Cavers. He says that the principles of the Restatement Second have at least 
three advantages: (1) they are mor邑 inkeeping with existing case law; (2) they are easier to apply; 
(3) they且reles likely to require the court to engage in what may be tremendously difficult and 
unc巴rtaintask of determining which of two or more purposes of a law is the primary purpose. Reese， 
Book Review， Fordam L. Rev. 153含 156-59(1966). 
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of the parties. (2) However， marriage is not only a private matter but also 
a matter of intense public concem. We can not ignore the relevant policies 
of the state with the dominant面白restin the marriage. τnerefore， a 
marriage wil1 not be held valid when it is against a strong public policy of a 
state which has the most significant relationship to the marriage， to uphold 
the validity of the marriage which is valid under the locallaw of the place of 
celebration. For example， when the state where at least one of the spouses 
was domiciled at the time of marriage and both made their home im-
mediately thereafter， prohibits poligamous marriage， certain incestuous 
marriages or marriages of minors， the marriage which violates these prohibi-
tions may be held invalid.5) In this situation， we can say that， when two 
policy considerations point in different direction or c1ash， the factor of 
implementation of the relevant policies of the state with the dominant 
interest in the determination of the particular issue is given greater 
討中ortance. (3) Finally， even if a marriage is not valid with respect to the 
requirement other than formalities， the marriage should not be held invalid， 
provided that it would be valid under the local law of some other state 
having a substantial relationship to the parties (for example the state of 
domicil of the parties).56) In this situation， upholding the validity of the 
marriage by application of the validity rule of the state of domici1 will be 
required by both of the choice of law policies mentioned above. 
A similar provision can be found in S 287 which deals with legitimacy.57) 
In these family law areas we can formulate to some extent definite rules， 
because we can decide to some extent definitely， what are the basic policies 
55) Restat巴ment，Second， Conflict of Laws 283， Comment h-i (1971). With respect to 
marriage provisions of th巴RestatementSecond， se Baade，“Marriage丘ndDivorce in American Corト
flicts Law: Govetnmental-Interests Analysis and the Restatement (Second)， 72 Colum. L. Rev. 329， 
354-381 (1972). 
56) Restat巴ment，Second， Conflict of Laws !i283， Comm巴nti (1971). 
57) !i 287 Law Governing Legit釘lacy;
(1) Whether a child is legit耐lateis determined by the local law of the state which， with respect to 
the particular isue， has the most significant relationship to the child and the parent under the 
principles stated in !i6. 
(2) The chi1d wil usually be held legitinlate if this would be his status under the locallaw of the state 
where either (a) the parent was domiciled when the chiId's status of legitinlacy is cla泊ledto have been 
created or (b) the child was domiciled when the parent acknowledged the child as his own. 
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in detennining the governing law， and when they point in different direc-
tions， which po1icy we should give priority. However， asfar as these provi-
sions cal for the application of the law of the state of most significant 
relationship， they are not perfectly definite rules. It seems to the present 
writer that is the reason why the chapter on status was eliminated from 
the field where definite rules can be found in the Proposed Official Draft in 
1967. As mentioned earlier， according to Professor Reese， we have probably 
reached the stage where most areas of choice of law can be covered by 
general principles which are subject to imprecise exceptions - the 
intermediate stage. He insists that we should press on， however， beyond 
these principles to the fonnulation of precise rules.58) He also suggests that 
the formulation of precise rules has already begun even in the tort field， 
which has been most uncertain.59) In this sense it can be said that Professor 
Reese is now in the position more favorable to rules than before， when he 
was theReporter of the Restatement Second. It is necessary to watch 
further developmentsin American Conflict of Laws in order to find whether 
this prediction comes true. 
58) Reese， supra note 6， at334. 
59) Id， at333. 
